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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

BOOK REVIEWS
How To PREPARE A CASE FOR TRIAL. By Elliott L. Biskind. New

York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1954. Pp. 197. $5.65.
Here is a book that can be used as a guide by the novice in
preparing a case for trial. Those problems which confront every
attorney in assembling and preparing facts and law for presentation are anticipated and answered. The book is written to be of
assistance in interviewing clients and witnesses, finding facts, applying the facts to the law, and preparing the facts and law for presentation in the court room. These problems are dealt with by the
author in a simple, explanatory manner. Beginning with how to
interview a client in order to determine the strong and weak
points of his case, the book then explains how to handle and understand witnesses. The author goes into detail and makes many suggestions on how, when and where witnesses should be interviewed
and what to do with the friendly as well as the unfriendly witness.
Chapters four and five explain how to investigate the facts and
how to prepare the law. A trial chart is included, showing what
facts to use and how to prove them. This is followed by an outline
on legal points and supporting law, with a general explanation on
where to look, how to test what is found and how to select the
material to be used. Early and thorough preparation are stressed,
with seven basic elements listed: collecting the facts; acquiring of
general, special and scientific knowledge; examination of substantive law; preliminary motions, examinations and requests for admissions; outline of elements to be proved in accordance with the
rules of evidence; preparing for opponent's proof; and, preparation
of data for examination of jurors, opening to the jury, closing
motions, requests to charge and summation.
Two chapters deal with final preparation for trial. Chapter nine
explains how to get facts admitted as evidence by preparing key
questions and by being ready to prove documents, letters and telegrams. Chapter ten deals with those things that should be readied
in advance so that adequate attention can be given them, such as
the opening statement to the jury, requested instructions to the
jury and motions to be made at the close of the case.
These chapters, together with chapters on final conferences with
witnesses, contents of trial memorandum, how to prepare expert
testimony, preparation of hypothetical questions, expert assistance,
the possibility of retaining trial counsel, selecting the jury and how
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to handle emotions, gives a picture of what to do, and, in a general
way, how to do it, in preparing a case for trial.
NEIL H. THOMPSON.

Hiss. By The Earl Jowitt. New York:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1953. Pp. 344. $3.95.

THE STRANCE CASE OF ALGER

It is not necessary to look far to observe the widespread effect
the case of Alger Hiss has had on current governmental and
political affairs. The author, a noted English jurist, has in this
book attempted to give the reading public a scholarly approach to
a controversial matter. Though the book is very well written, the
injection of a certain natural bias in favor of English trial methods
detracts from its effectiveness. The trial practice which might serve
English courts quite adequately is not necessarily adapted in all
of its details to the American courts, and vice versa.
The author attempts to divorce Hiss's political sympathies from
the actual issue at the trial, namely, whether Hiss committed perjury.
Apparently he feels, with considerable logical basis, that only by
doing this and thereby clearing away much of the emotional smoke
screen which tends to cloud the issues in cases of this nature can
the matter be properly analyzed. The result is a book in which
many questions are put to the reader. Thus, in the author's view
of the matter it is hard to see why, if Hiss gave the famous "pumpkin papers" to Chambers, as Chambers claimed he did, he should
have made the elementary blunder of passing them along in his
own handwriting. It would seem that a person educated at Harvard
Law School and graduated with an excellent record, who subsequently pursued a highly successful career in public life, would be
discerning enough to avoid such an obvious pitfall.
Why, he asks, was not another damning piece of evidence, the
typewriter used to copy several of the other documents, also destroyed? It was an ancient machine, readily traceable by experts,
but instead of destroying it as a guilty man would be likely to do,
Hiss simply made a gift of it to the family of some iormer household servants. The author observes that such conduct is scarcely
that to be expected of a competent spy. The author further points
out that since Hiss in his position with the State Department, had
constant access to the documents and paraphrased them for his
superior as a matter of routine, it is not beyond the realm of possi-
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bility that someone else in the department could have stolen the
documents and passed them on to Chambers, the two using Hiss
as a convenient scapegoat to camouflage the identity of the real
thief.
However, even the author admits that the typewritten documents
are far more difficult to explain away. It was claimed by the prosecution that Hiss's wife typed them. There is, however, a somewhat
far-fetched possibility that some third party might have gained
control of the typewriter for the purpose of copying the papers.
One of the most absorbing chapters in the book is that dealing
with trial by jury. In Jowitt's view, trial by jury in the United States
too often generates into trial by newspaper, since as a practical
matter it is virtually impossible for any well-informed juror not to
have a preconceived opinion in a celebrated case due to the extensive press coverage and commentary. This iS, of course, a clear
reflection of the English attitude on the matter, since English law
prohibits all but the most cursory factual comment on- trial proceedings.
Whether the book will change the opinions of the persons who
read it on the question of Hiss's guilt or innocence is difficult to
say. Generally speaking, however, it provides interesting reading
despite its somewhat annoying and seemingly ethnocentric emphasis on the superiority of English legal methods.
DOUGLAS BIRDZELL.

By William Winslow Crosskey.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953. In two volumes.
Pp. xi, 1410.

POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION.

This is probably one of the most magnificently controversial
works on the Constitution of the United States which will ever be
written. It has already stimulated intense discussion among lawyers
and judges. An entire issue of the University of Chicago Law Review has been devoted to presentation of views concerning it, with
contributions from men like Judge Charles E. Clark of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals praising the book and other eminent lawyers describing it as "biased" and "unobjective." The host of reviews
it has engendered have been of a similarly divided character.
William Winslow Crosskey is a member of the faculty of law at
the University of Chicago who has for mrany years been engaged in
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teaching constitutional law. What might be termed his "angle of
approach" has not been via the usual law school method of casebook study and discussion. The distinctive feature of his course
has been a historical-semantic method involving close examination
of the history of the Constitution and the usages of language prevalent at the time it was drafted. This does not sound particularly
revolutionary, but no one else seems to have done it.
The basic thesis of this book is that it is impossible to understand
what the Constitution was intended to accomplish until one understands what its words meant to its authors. If, for instance, the
word "state" meant one thing to the founding fathers-as Crosskey
contends that it did-and something entirely different to succeeding
generations, then the succeeding generations could not have understood the Constitution as the founding fathers intended. As Crosskey sees it, this is precisely what has happened. He argues that
years of political discussion and debate constantly flowing around
the basic charter have brought about changes in the interpretation
of vital provisions and phrases. Original meanings have first become blurred, then discarded, then forgotten; new understandings
and in some cases new political shibboleths have grown up to
create a substantially altered document.
Obviously, if this major premise is granted, it becomes a matter
of considerable importance to discover precisely what changes have
taken place over the years. Crosskey furnishes the answer by a process of reconstructing a specialized vocabulary consisting exclusively of words defined as his evidence indicates the framers of the
Constitution understood them. This leads, at times, to much difficult reading. It is necessary to delve through page upon page of
intricate discussions centering around word usages in Blackstone,
Samuel Johnson's dictionary of 1755, pamphlets used by southern
states-righters arguing in favor of slavery and the like. It also leads
to some startling and unorthodox conclusions.
Probably the most illustrative of the results Crosskey reaches is
found in his treatment of the clause giving Congress the power "to
regulate commerce . . . among the several states." Traditionally,
the courts have supposed this clause to limit the jurisdiction of the
federal government to the regulation of trade flowing between a
citizen of state A to a citizen of state B and crossing a state line 'in
the process. But in Crosskey's view of the matter, this result is
justified only if the word "commerce," the word "state," the phrase
"to regulate commerce," and the phrase "among the several states"
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-which are the operative core of the commerce clause-are being
used now in the same sense they possessed in 1787.
His book commences, in fact, with a discussion of this precise
question. His conclusion is that the word "state" was generally
used at the time the Constitution was written in what he calls a
"societal" sense, as denoting the people who "belonged to" the
state. This transforms "state" into a plural noun in the same class
as "tribe" or "society," indicating a multitude of individuals. "Commerce" and "among" undergo a similar broadening, as do the other
phrases mentioned.
How far this technique carries him is illustrated by the conclusion
he reaches concerning the scope of the congressional power over
commerce. "By way of summary, then, upon the subject of the
national commerce power: it has been established, on the basis of
strictly neutral, unsuspect evidence,' that in the years 1777-1780,
only a short time before the commerce clause was drawn, the
American people still generally understood 'the regulation of commerce,' or the 'regulation of trade,' in an inclusive sense; a sense
which comprehended not only foreign, or external commerce, but
agriculture, manufactures, inn-keeping, horsekeeping, and every
other branch of the internal business of the country." - The emphasis is supplied.
It understates the matter to say simply that this is a conclusion
completely at variance with the general understanding of the subject and bound to be hotly disputed. Attempt to visualize, if possible, the code of this state without the provisions governing the
subjects listed above and it is possible to perceive how far-reaching
his arguments are. Yet Crosskey goes much further than simply
making an argument in favor of a unitary national power over commerce. His contention is that the federal government possesses
unitary power in many other fields as well, and that the present
jurisdictional divisions between state and federal authority are
radically different from what was originally contemplated. If accepted, this theory of the Constitution would result in a lessening
of state and an increase in federal authority of very considerable
proportions.

1. Crosskey's glowing description of his own supporting materials is typical of the
literary style employed throughout the book. It is a fair sample of the vigour of his
presentation; there is nothing half-way about his views. To do him justice, the material
he has presented appears to generally bear out his characterization of it.
2. 1 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution 290-91 (1953).
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All this, of course, is completely unorthodox. But that does not
necessarily mean that itjis also completely unsound in its reading of
history and language. For it is one of the sometimes uncomfortable features of the book that it cannot all be shrugged off as simply
a personal eccentricity of its author, or as a grandiose rationalization for the extension of federal jurisdiction. Crosskey's discussion
of the commerce clause, for example, is backed by something like
three hundred pages of closely-reasoned argument, evidence and
documentation, all of it drawn from the time of which he writes,
representing years of first-hand examination of the original documents of the period. And quite often he is successful in establishing a strong case; his analysis of the ex post facto clause-another
good example-would appear to be convincing in its assertion that
the men who wrote the Constitution intended to prohibit retroactive laws of either a civil or criminal nature.3
The coverage and extensive character of the work may be indicated by an enumeration of the parts into which it is divided.
The National Power Over Commerce takes up Part I of the book.
Part II discusses the "Interrelationships Between the Commerce
Clause and the Imports-and-Exports, Ex-Post-Facto, and Contracts
Clauses of Section 10 of Article I; Part III represents the logical
culmination of his thinking and strikes out boldly for "A Unitary
View of the National Governing Powers." Part IV discusses the
"Supreme Court's Intended Place in the Constitutional System,"
and Part V takes up "The Supreme Court and the Constitutional
Limitations on State Governmental Authority."
Throughout his writing, Crosskey returns constantly to the same
single theme: that as the courts are now interpreting the Constitution, the federal government is being denied powers which it
was the clear intent of the founding fathers it should exercise. His
explanation is logical enough, if one grants his major premise: the
present division of power between the states and the federal government rests upon a series of compromises forced by the political
necessities of the Republic's early years, when north and south were
split over the slavery issue and the other matters which eventually
led to the Civil War. This may sound impossible. Yet when it is
recalled that recent history furnishes examples of statesmen giving
away whole nations-Austria and Czechoslovakia-to avert World
War II, the idea that statesmen of an earlier day might sacrifice
3. At present the clause is judicially interpreted as forbidding only retroactive criminal
legislation.
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points of constitutional principle to prevent secession becomes
much more acceptable. Moreover, during much of the period with
which Crosskey is concerned, southerners were in control of the
main branches of the government and thus, in his eyes, found it
possible to interpret the Constitution as the exigencies of their
cause demanded.
Viewing the matter in this light, Crosskey is enabled to draw a
number of further conclusions which sound at first strange and indefensible. The career of John Marshall thus becomes a stubborn
rear-guard action in defense of the Constitution as he understood
it (Crosskey thinks he understood it as Crosskey does, of course),
rather than an exercise in the judicial broadening of governmental
power. The Dred Scott case falls into the pattern as a temporary
surrender to the political demands of the South, which it undeniably
was. The entire government of the United States becomes a far
more powerful mechanism than has heretofore been supposed.
If all these ideas sound controversial on first reading, they become
even more so on a second time through the book. Crosskey himself
obviously expected contradiction and disbelief, and he wrote in a
sustained strain of scholastically vehement and at times belligerent
assertion which makes the work read at times more like a pamphleteer's tract than an academic inquiry into the origins of the Constitution. It is, in fact, unmistakably reminiscent of the literary style
employed to debate these precise issues in the early days of the
Constitution, and he probably picked up much of it through his
research. As one reviewer has already pointed out, few controversialists in modern times have gone so far as to personally compile an index to a book in such a manner that it will tend to sustain
their basic arguments; but Crosskey did precisely that.
The summary given should probably be sufficient to indicate in a
general way why this book is arousing heated discussion. Left unanswered is the question of how influential the book will prove to
be. It seems probable that on a short-term basis it will be largely
disregarded. The theories it propounds are so far out of accord
with previous thinking that the initial general reaction must almost
necessarily be one of disbelief. And even if Crosskey's thinking and
research are accepted as valid, the forces which molded the Constitution in the shape it has taken are still with us today, reinforced
by long usage and fortified by judicial precedent piled upon judicial
precedent. Thus, to expect the courts and the congress to reverse
the pattern of a hundred and sixty years of Constitutional history
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overnight is obviously out of the question. It may well be, therefore, that Crosskey's analysis will slip into obscurity as a curious
and anomalous discussion of matters past and done with.
But when this is said, mention should also be made of the other
possibility. If, over the years which lie ahead, Crosskey's interpretations and the evidence he has developed stand the test of further
research and inquiry, it seems difficult to say that the book will be
without its influence. Constitutional writings tend to have their influence felt slowly and gradually. They become authoritative by
slow degrees, as the truth--or untruth--of the things they say is
developed by the passage of time. What the standing of the book
will be fifty years from now, only time itself can answer. Crosskey
may go down in history as a lawyer who turned historian and lost
his way in both fields; but there is also a substantial possibility be
will be remembered as the constitutional scholar whose studies
have made all other writings on the Constitution obsolete. His
book represents an attempt to do nothing less.
One thing, at least, may be said with complete certainty. Whatever the book's final fate, no work on constitutional law can hereafter fail to deal with the questions it raises. Crosskey must be
taken into account. In that accomplishment alone, he has performed a remarkable achievement.
CHARLES LIEBERT CRUM.*

Correction
In the January 1954 issue of the North Dakota Law Review, the
publisher of the book "Psychiatry and the Law", by Manfred F.
Guttmacher and Henry Weihofen, was erroneously listed as A. A.
Horton and Company. The actual publisher is W. W. Norton
Company, 101 5th Avenue, New York 3, New York. We extend
our apologies for this error which misled our readers.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.

